

State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file

July 14, 1971

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Exchange of Classified Information
and Intelligence

In a conversation with Jim Lowenstein of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff today, he referred to Senator Symington's letter of July 7th and asked what action was being taken on it. I responded that I had just started work on the matter and that he certainly was asking for a vast amount of information on paper. Jim said he appreciated this, and perhaps we would like to send them at the outset information that was readily available, with later installments to follow. I was non-committal.

I asked whether I was right in my assumption that the letter reflected Senator Symington's conviction, probably reinforced on his recent trip to Europe, that information was made available to friendly governments which was not available to the SFRC and the Congress generally. Lowenstein said that that was the thrust of the inquiry. He then went on to cite an example he had previously used in conversation with me, on what he has termed a most frustrating and unsatisfactory situation. He said it has frequently happened that he and other Senate staff members have asked at U.S. Embassies in the field to see certain telegrams, only to be denied access to those telegrams for various reasons, even including allusion to executive privilege. At the same time, when the same question was raised with certain foreign embassies in the same foreign capital, that embassy would show Lowenstein the U.S. Embassy cable which the U.S. Embassy had denied him. Considering that the friendly foreign office

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and its embassy in the field all had access to this information, it was improper that the U.S. Embassy should deny the Senate staff such data.

I asked if this was the basis for the third question in the Symington letter as to how and where the information/intelligence is received or exchanged. Lowenstein agreed that that was the question involved, and I said that all we could give was a feeling that such information might be exchanged either in Washington or in the capital of the country concerned. It would be important to be more specific. Lowenstein agreed.

I then said that it would take quite a good deal of time to pull all this information together; Lowenstein responded that much of it might speedily be pulled together if we could get together with the NDPC people. He noted that they had various charts that would explain the arrangements. I said that I thought the bulk of the information would lie in the area between State and Defense.

In closing, Lowenstein said he wondered whether the command level of the Department realized how much information was exchanged, "including, for example, the weekly truck for Ottawa."

PM/JW:Joseph J. Wolf:7/14/71

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